

**IMPLICATIONS OF  
MULTI-RESOLUTION MODELING (MRM)  
AND EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS  
FOR VALIDATION**

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
**Foundations '02**

**October 23, 2002**


# Common Examples of Multi-Resolution Thinking

- **Back-of-the-envelope calculation to check a more detailed computation**
  - Estimate aircraft cost by component (e.g., engine, airframe, avionics, etc.); check against historical cost per pound
- **Stories to explain model behavior**
  - Used to debug model or data
- **Simple displays for presenting, explaining, and generalizing results to the client**
  - Model shows the analyst a few trees; analyst shows the client the forest

# Show Client a Simple Display, Generalize From High-Resolution Results



# Multi-Resolution Modeling to Link Levels of Analysis



**MRM is building families of mutually consistent models at different levels of resolution**

- Design family together (integrate from start)
- Use all relevant info.
- Seek mutual calibration
- Construct “good seams”

# Exploratory Analysis, Massive Uncertainty, and Validation

- Many problems we work on have massive uncertainty, e.g.,
  - Technology and threats will change between now and 2030
  - We can't build predictive models
- Use an exploratory analysis strategy
  - Look for robust and adaptive policies
  - Requires:
    - Agile models (few variables)
    - Unbridled use of extrapolation
- When is model & data for exploratory analysis “valid”?
  - Tentative suggestion:
    - Model is structurally correct
    - Domain for analysis includes all cases of interest
  - What practical tests can we apply?

# Outline

- **Example of working at multiple levels of resolution**
- **Consistency and validation**
- **Motivated metamodels, or the importance of a good story**

# **An Example Use of MRM: Comparing Weapon Systems**

**Given a specified amount of funding, should we buy weapon system A or B or C?**

**To support a recommendation to buy system B, the analyst argues:**

- 1. Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 constitute an adequate test**
- 2. System B is more combat effective than A or C in scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4**
- 3. System B has adequate non-combat performance (addressed in the paper, but not in this presentation)**

# Recommended SecDef Operational Challenges

- ***Early halt*** of classic armored invasion given depth (e.g., in Kuwait or Northern Saudi Arabia)
- ***Early shallow-halt*** of fast parallel-operation invasion without depth (e.g., Korea) and with multifaceted opponent
- ***Early offensive actions*** without first building massive force
- **Effective *low-risk* early intervention** in “next Bosnia”
- **Effective *low-risk* peacemaking** in urban environments


# Select Challenges Based on Analytic Importance

- Categorize challenges in three dimensions
  - Likelihood (low - high)
  - Consequence (small - great)
  - Difficulty (easy - hard)
- Choose hard challenges-but not too hard
- Balance likelihood versus consequence



# Decompose Challenges Hierarchically


## Early Halt




- Cross-cutting:**
- Network-centric C<sup>3</sup>, RSTA
  - Long-range fires
  - Effective ops with allies
  - Presence and forward-lean at warning
  - Intra-theater mobility

# EXHALT-CF:


## Use Long-Range Fires to Halt an Armored Column



# Input Combinations that Kill 500 Armored Vehicles Within 100 km



# Input Combinations the Kill 4000 Armored Vehicles Within 300 km




# An Example Use of MRM: Comparing Weapon Systems

Given a specified amount of funding, should we buy weapon system A or B or C?

To support a recommendation to buy system B, the analyst argues:

1. Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 constitute an adequate test
2. System B is more combat effective than A or C in scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4
3. System B has adequate non-combat performance (addressed in the paper, but not in this presentation)

# RAND's Force-On-Force Modeling Suite Provides A Unique Capability for High Fidelity Analysis



# Use of JANUS Suite for Long Range Precision Fires

- **JANUS** simulates movement of each Red vehicle across the terrain (scripted)
- **Periodic snapshots of Red vehicle positions are provided to a man-in-the-loop[1]**
  - 5 minute intervals
  - See a vehicle with probability  $P_{\text{TREE}}$ ,  $P_{\text{OPEN}}$
- **Man-in-the-loop[1] selects aim points, impact times for long range fires**
  - Aim only at open areas
  - $T_{\text{IMPACT}} \geq T_{\text{SNAPSHOT}} + \Delta T_{\text{DELAY}}$
- **MADAM simulates kills of Red vehicles**
  - Monte Carlo, run 20 trials to obtain “stable” estimates

[1] For some weapons, the function of the man-in-the-loop has been automated.

# Effectiveness of ATACMS/BAT Can Vary by an Order of Magnitude

## 1996 DSB Summer Study

- 3 kills per ATACMS/BAT

## 1998 DSB Summer Study

- 0.35 kills per ATACMS/BAT

# Explanations and Plausible Counterarguments

## 1996 DSB Summer Study

- 3 kills per ATACMS/BAT

- No foliage

**Man-in-the-loop aimed only at clearings**

- 458 of 504 Red vehicles were AFVs

**BAT submunitions only “hear” combat vehicles**

- 50+ AFVs/packet, 50-100m separation between AFVs

**ATACMS/BAT has a huge footprint**

## 1998 DSB Summer Study

- 0.35 kills per ATACMS/BAT


- Tree cover

- 104 of 543 Red vehicles were AFVs

- 3-10 AFVs/pkt, 150-600m separation between AFVs


**SO, IS IT THE MODEL, OR IS IT THE WEAPON???**

# Kills per Salvo Versus Vulnerable AFVs in Footprint




# Against Sparse Red Formations, Can't Time Shots Well Enough to Target Specific Packets

Numbers of vulnerable AFVs in a typical footprint, DSB '98




# Precise Timing Unnecessary Against Large, Dense Red Formations

Numbers of vulnerable AFVs in a typical footprint, DSB '96




# Estimating Number of Vulnerable AFVs in the Footprint



# Most Footprints Contain Few Targets

Comparing Data from DSB '98 with PEM estimates




# PGM Effectiveness Model (PEM)

- **Low-resolution model**
- **Scales effectiveness of long range precision fires for influence of multiple factors**
  - **Weapon characteristics**
  - **Impact time error**
  - **Terrain**
  - **Density of Red formation**
- **Uses of PEM**
  - **Exploratory analysis**
  - **Subroutine to incorporate above factors in other models**
  - **Establish face validity of high-resolution model**
  - **Generalize high-resolution results**


# Outline

- Example of working at multiple levels of resolution
- Consistency and validation
- Motivated metamodels, or the importance of a good story

# The Usual Definition of Consistency Between High- and Low-Resolution Models



# A More General Definition of Consistency Between High- and Low-Resolution Models



# Validity is Consistency Between a Model and the Real World

Ensemble of real-world observations

$$E_{obs}(\vec{x}_{lr}) = \left\{ \vec{v}_{real} \mid \text{AggIn}(\vec{v}_{real}) = \vec{x}_{lr} \right\}$$

Aggregation function

Ensemble of aggregated real-world observations

$$E_{agg}(\vec{x}_{lr}) = \bigcup_{\vec{v}_{real} \in E_{obs}(\vec{x}_{lr})} \left\{ \vec{y}_{agg} \mid \vec{y}_{agg} = \text{AggOut}(\vec{v}_{real}) \right\}$$

Disaggregation function

Model inputs

Start

$\vec{x}_{lr}$

Model


Model outputs

$$LR(\vec{x}_{lr}) \cong \text{WhatAttributes}(E_{agg}(\vec{x}_{lr}))$$

# What Attributes of $E_{agg}(\overrightarrow{x|lr})$ Should the Low-Resolution Model Estimate?

- Assume  $\overrightarrow{y_{agg}}$  is a scalar
- If the high-resolution model is well-behaved, then  $E_{agg}(\overrightarrow{x|lr})$  is an interval
  - If it is a small interval, estimate the midpoint
  - If you intend to use an *a fortiori* argument, estimate the MAX or MIN
  - Otherwise, you must estimate something else
    - Range (MAX and MIN)
    - Confidence interval
    - Mean and standard deviation  $\overrightarrow{\quad}$  } Require a probability distribution on  $\overrightarrow{x|hr}$
- If the high-resolution model is ill-behaved, e.g., chaotic, then  $E_{agg}(\overrightarrow{x|lr})$  need not be an interval

# Kills per Salvo Versus Vulnerable AFVs in Footprint



# Sources of Variation in Kills per Shot for Fixed # Vulnerable AFVs

- **Random variation**
  - JANUS suite has Monte Carlo elements
- **Hidden variables – phenomena in the high-resolution model that aren't retained in PEM**
  - Kinds of AFVs (tank, BMP, ...)
  - Pattern (linear, “cross”, ...)
  - Interference (e.g., noise from vehicles not in footprint)
  - ???

# Possible Bias from Using Average Kills per Salvo from This Sample

- **Manipulation of hidden variables by Blue or Red**
  - e.g., Red noisemakers as decoys
- **Quantities that were held constant in the high-resolution cases we had, but could be varied in future cases**

**These issues make experimental design problematic.**

# Outline

- **Example of working at multiple levels of resolution**
- **Consistency and validation**
- **Motivated metamodels, or the importance of a good story**

# **Why a Good Story is Important**

**(or why a model shouldn't be merely a black box)**

- **Establish face validity**
- **Present, explain, and generalize results to client**
- **Extrapolate results**
- **Build a better metamodel**

# Extreme Approaches to Building a Metamodel

- **Statistical**
  - Build a data set of many cases from object model
  - Use statistical methods (e.g., regression) to analyze data
  - Disregard knowledge of the model's “innards”
- **Phenomenological**
  - Start with the most exact theory available
  - Simplify by aggregating, rearranging, combining terms
  - Use physical insights (e.g., conservation laws)
  - Disregard data generated by the object model

**This experiment explored how to constructively combine the two approaches**

# Desiderata for a Good Metamodel

- **Goodness of fit**
- **A plausible storyline connecting outcome to inputs**
  - For cognitive purposes
  - To support extrapolation
- **Parsimony**
  - To permit exploratory analysis
- **Identification of “critical components”**
  - Sets of variables all of which must work to make the system as a whole perform adequately
  - Enter the metamodel as nonlinearities, e.g.,
    - Products
    - Thresholds

# Illustration of Critical Components (using a “Halt Phase” example)

**$D$**  = Distance at which Red column is halted (Outcome)

**$A$**  = Number of Blue shooters

**$\delta$**  = Number of Red vehicles killed per shooter-day

**$T$**  = Time Blue starts shooting

**$\xi$**  = Number of Red vehicles to kill

**$V$**  = Velocity of Red column

In a linear model, tradeoffs are fixed, universal


$$D = a_0 + a_1 A + a_2 \delta + a_3 T + a_4 \xi + a_5 V$$

But not in a model based on (nonlinear) phenomenology


$$D = V \times \left( T + \frac{\xi}{A\delta} \right)$$

# EXHALT-CF:

## Use Long-Range Fires to Halt an Armored Column



# Metamodel 1: Regress Dhalt on Lowest Level Inputs



# Scorecard for Metamodel 1

	Model 1
RMSE (km)	140
Storyline	No
# Calib Const	15
# Aggreg Vars	14
Crit Comps	No


Fit linear (in undetermined coefficients) model  $L$  to cases where:

$$0 < D_{halt} < Obj$$

Calculate metamodel  $M$  as:

$$M = \text{Max}\{ 0, \text{Min}\{ L, Obj \} \}$$

# Metamodel #2: Regress Dhalt on Intermediate Variables



## Scorecard for Metamodels 1 & 2

	Model 1	Model 2
RMSE (km)	140	84
Storyline	No	Fragments
# Calib Const	15	11
# Aggreg Vars	14	10
Crit Comps	No	No


Fit linear model  $L$  to cases where:

$$0 < D_{halt} < Obj$$

Calculate metamodel  $M$  as:

$$M = \text{Max}\{ 0, \text{Min}\{ L, Obj \} \}$$

# Metamodel 3 & 4: Derive Form from a Story, Calibrate with Statistics



# The Storyline for Metamodels 3 and 4

Blue chooses the strategy with the smaller halt distance:

$$D_{halt} = \text{Max}\{0, \text{Min}\{ D(dep), D(le), Obj \}\}$$

Against “In Depth” strategy, Red has constant velocity once he starts:

$$D(dep) = V \times (T(dep) - T_{delay})$$

“Leading Edge” strategy rolls Red back:

$$D(le) = V \times (T(le) - T_{delay}) - \Delta D_{roll}$$

# Estimating Halt Times for Metamodel 3

$T(dep)$  and  $T(le)$  should satisfy

$$\bar{A} \times (T(dep) - Tx) = RSD(dep), \quad \bar{A} \times (T(le) - Tx) = RSD(le)$$

(Average number of shooters multiplied by time spent shooting equals shooter-days required to halt Red.)

Use some convenient approximation to  $\bar{A}$

## The Form of Metamodel 3

Use regression to determine coefficients in:

$$D(dep) = c_0 - c_1 VTdelay + c_2 VTx + c_3 V \frac{RSD(dep)}{\bar{A}}$$

$$D(le) = c_4 - c_5 VTdelay + c_6 VTx + c_7 V \frac{RSD(le)}{\bar{A}} - c_8 \Delta Droll$$

Note “critical component.” To halt a fast Red (large  $V$ ) in a short distance (small  $D$ ), Blue must:

- Reduce  $Tx$  (response time); *and*
- Decrease  $RSD$  (e.g., better weapons); *and*
- Increase  $\bar{A}$  (number of shooters)

## Scorecard for Metamodels 1-3

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
RMSE (km)	140	84	30
Storyline	No	Fragments	Yes
# Calib Coeffs	15	11	9
# Aggreg Vars	14	10	5
Crit Comps	No	No	Yes

Fit linear models  $L(dep)$  and  $L(le)$  to cases where:

$$0 < D(dep) < Obj, 0 < D(le) < Obj$$

Calculate metamodel  $M$  as:

$$M = \text{Max}\{ 0, \text{Min}\{ L(dep), L(le), Obj \} \}$$

## The Form of Metamodel 4

Solve these integral equation exactly:

$$\int_{T_x}^{T(dep)} A(t)dt = RSD(dep), \quad \int_{T_x}^{T(le)} A(t)dt = RSD(le)$$

Then use regression to determine coefficients for:

$$D(dep) = c_0 - c_1VTdelay + c_2VTx + c_3V[T(dep) - Tx]$$

$$D(le) = c_4 - c_5VTdelay + c_6VTx + c_7V[T(le) - Tx] - c_8\Delta Droll$$

## Scorecard for Metamodels 1-4

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
RMSE (km)	140	84	30	8
Storyline	No	Fragments	Yes	Yes, but
# Calib Coeffs	15	11	9	9
# Aggreg Vars	14	10	5	5
Crit Comps	No	No	Yes	Yes

Fit linear models  $L(dep)$  and  $L(le)$  to cases where:

$$0 < D(dep) < Obj, 0 < D(le) < Obj$$

Calculate metamodel  $M$  as:

$$M = \text{Max}\{ 0, \text{Min}\{ L(dep), L(le), Obj \} \}$$

# Summary of Motivated Metamodeling Experiment

- **Statistics uninformed by phenomenology yielded a poor metamodel**
  - EXHALT-CF is not linear, and it is not smooth
  - Strategy choice (“In Depth” vs. “Leading Edge”) introduces a “kink”
- **Adding phenomenology from bottom up yielded a better but still mediocre metamodel**
  - Built in meaningful combinations of low-level variables
  - Inputs still related to outcome through a “black box”
- **Adding phenomenology from top down yielded good to very good metamodels**
  - Story (theory, if you prefer) now connects inputs to outcome -- no more “black box”

# Wrap-up: MRM is a Fruitful Response to:

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- **Cognitive needs**


- Understanding
- Explaining to colleagues
- Explaining to clients

A story (theory) made formal becomes a metamodel, validated by tests for consistency

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- **Need for breadth AND depth**

- MRM ties models at different levels into a consistent package



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- **Massive uncertainty**

- Unbridled extrapolation
- Exploratory analysis
- Need models with few input variables

Need a different view of validation


- Model structure correct
- Domain includes cases of interest

# Backups

# The What and Why of Metamodels

- **What is a metamodel?**
  - A relatively small, simple model that mimics selected behaviors of a large, complex model
- **Some reasons to build a metamodel**
  - **Cognitive:** You need a plausible story to explain why the large model behaves as it does
  - **Exploratory analysis:** A small model has the analytic agility for exploring behavior over a vast input domain
  - **Parsimony:** Having a small number of independent variables is so important that we call it out separately



# Taxonomy of Models



# Importance of MRM

- **Cognitive needs**
  - Use high-resolution models to investigate underlying phenomena
  - Use low-resolution models for analysis of choice, and for forest-vs.-trees reasons
- **Explanatory power**
- **Uncertainty, ignorance, and chaos**
  - Detail is not the same as knowledge
- **Exploratory analysis, analytical agility**
  - Economy

# Man-in-the-loop selects target and leads it; MADAM Simulates Kills



# Lessons About Long Range Precision Fires

## (from Exploratory Analysis with PEM)

- Effectiveness of long-range precision fires varies by a factor of 50-100, depending on:
  - Time\_of\_last\_update (TOA\_error)
  - Weapon characteristics (Footprint)
  - Terrain (Clearing widths)
  - Density of Red column
- Small clearings nullify value of a large footprint, but enhance the value of a small TOA\_error
- High Red density nullifies importance of TOA\_error
- A large footprint, high TOA\_error weapon (ATACMS/BAT) is more effective than a small footprint, low TOA\_error weapon (aircraft-delivered SFW) only if both Red density and clearing width are sufficiently large
  - I.e., if on average ATACMS/BAT finds enough Red vehicles in killing zone


**Conclusions are quantitative, not just qualitative**

# Estimating Shots per Day: A Loose End

- Objective was to estimate kills per day by ATACMS/BAT
- We have:
  - $\text{Kills/salvo} = f(\# \text{ vulnerable AFVs})$
  - $\# \text{ vulnerable AFVs} = g(\text{TOA\_error, footprint, terrain, Red\_formation})$
- We still need:
  - $\# \text{ shots per day}$  by TOA\_error, footprint, terrain, and Red\_formation
- Don't know how to get it from high-resolution simulation, so assume a number
  - Based on shot opportunities?
  - Or on capacity to shoot?


# Kills per Salvo is Highly Variable

(DSB '98 salvos with 5 vulnerable AFVs in footprint)




# Kills per Salvo is Highly Variable - II

(DSB '98 salvos with 10 vulnerable AFVs in footprint)




# The Usual Definition of Consistency Between High- and Low-Resolution Models

**Start**




# A More General Definition of Consistency Between High- and Low-Resolution Models





# Ways to Change Resolution – II

## Use Intermediate Variables



$$Y = F(X_1, X_2, X_3)$$



$$X_1 = G_1(X_4, X_5)$$

$$X_2 = G_2(X_6, X_7)$$

$$X_3 = G_3(X_8, X_9, X_{10})$$

# Ways to Change Resolution – III

## Physical Versus Statistical Description




# Ways to Change Resolution - IV


## Abstraction

- In PEM, the concept of “clearing” is elementary
- In high-resolution simulation, the concept must be derived from more elementary constructs (terrain, etc. )
- Definition of a clearing depends on resolution
  - Man-in-the-loop must see a clearing to target it (low resolution)
  - Weapon detects vehicles in the open from close up (high resolution)
- Definition may also depend on weapon characteristics
  - Orientation effects (e.g., LOCAAS)

# Terrain Seen at Low Resolution (DSB '98)



# A Clearing Seen At High Resolution (DSB '98)



# Use a Story to Guide Extrapolation

“Early in the process the evolution of the system should be dominated by the expansion of the cloud, the rate of which is proportional to  $t^3$ . Later the evolution the system should be dominated by a decay process, which occurs like  $e^{-\alpha t}$ . So the quantity of interest should rise to a maximum and then fall asymptotically to zero.”

# Our Modus Operandi is Experimental

- **In a real-world problem, the large model could:**
  - Have thousands of inputs
  - Be costly to run
  - Provide only a few cases for statistical analysis
- **For this exercise our large model is EXHALT-CF:**
  - Approximately 60 inputs
  - Small enough to allow us to generate unlimited cases
  - Complex enough to provide a fair test
- **We explore the spectrum between the extreme approaches**
  - Start with “pure” statistics
  - Progressively add more phenomenology

# Generate an Analysis Data Set

- **Specify distributions for 25 EXHALT-CF input variables**
  - Mostly uniform distributions
  - Sample all possible regions without regard for likelihood
- **Set remaining input variables to constants**
- **Generate a Monte Carlo sample of 1000 cases**
- **Collect data for each case**

# Poor Identification of Nonlinearities in Metamodel 1

## EXHALT

(Vehicles to kill)

=(# divisions)

×(vehicles/division)

×(break point)

(Halt distance)

=Smaller of distances for

“In Depth” strategy,

“Leading Edge” strategy

## METAMODEL 1

Coeff significant at P=.05

Coeff not significant!

Coeff not significant!

Variables for both

strategies affect

halt distances

in all cases

**Regression frequently generates flatly wrong conclusions about the importance of variables.**